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ABSTRACT. Within the broad discourse on the concept of fit and its relevance for the governance of social–ecological systems,
problems of spatial fit have attracted particular attention. Mismatches abound between the geographical extent of an
environmental resource and the territorial scope of the institutions affecting its use. Managing water resources around river
basins is, perhaps, the most prominent illustration of attempts to reconcile the boundaries of an environmental resource with
those of its respective institutions. Achieving perfect spatial fit has, however, proved an elusive task in practice. Beyond the
difficulties of defining the physical boundaries of water and reordering institutional arrangements to reflect these, improving
spatial fit for water can create new spatial misfits with other policy sectors upon which sustainable water management is
dependent. The paper explores the way spatial fit is conceptualized, institutionalized, and practised, using the EU Water
Framework Directive and its implementation in one sub-basin of the Rhine as an exemplar. The paper develops from the analysis
a more differentiated and context-sensitive understanding of the concept of spatial fit of practical value to policy makers.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the broad discourse on the concept of fit and its
relevance for the governance of social–ecological systems,
problems of spatial fit have attracted particular attention
(Young and Underdal 1997, Folke et al. 1998, 2007, Young
2002, 2005, Galaz et al. 2008). Mismatches abound between
the geographical extent of an environmental resource and the
territorial scope of the institutions affecting its use. A common
example is the regulation of fishing in international waters by
national governments alone. In the absence of a binding
international agreement, the tendency is for each country to
allow its fishing fleet to overfish, thus depleting fish stocks
for all. To take a second example, efforts to minimize air
pollution by local authorities alone are likely to fail, as the
pollutants extend far beyond city limits. Spatial misfits of this
kind are often responsible for negative externalities, benefiting
freeriders and harming others beyond the reach of the
responsible institution. Responding to this problem by
increasing the geographical scale of institutional arrangements
until all externalities are covered may seem an obvious
solution, but such a strategy often brings with it serious
drawbacks in the form of unwieldy and bureaucratic structures
with very little sensitivity to local or regional contexts. In order
to avoid the detrimental effects of spatial misfits, scholars and
policy makers have for decades striven to improve spatial fit
in the design of institutions. The aim of such endeavors has
been to create institutional arrangements that are more
effective because they are tailored to fit the geography of the
natural resource or ecosystem in question. Managing water
resources around river basins is perhaps the most prominent
illustration of attempts to reconcile the boundaries of an
environmental resource with those of its respective institutions
(Dietz et al. 2003, Moss 2003, Mitchell 2005). 
Achieving perfect spatial fit is, however, an elusive task in
practice, for several reasons (Young 2002, 2005, Galaz et al.
2008). It has proved difficult to define the territorial
boundaries of a natural resource, not least because of its
complex interdependence with broader ecosystems. The
resolution of one problem of spatial fit often creates new ones
with other policy fields relevant to the management of the
resource. Furthermore, organizing management structures
around the physical geography of a resource alone runs the
risk of overlooking its political, socioeconomic, and cultural
geographies. Recent research agrees, therefore, that we need
to take a closer look at problems of spatial fit and their
resolution in practice in order to arrive at a more differentiated
and context-sensitive understanding of the concept that is, at
the same time, of greater practical value to policy makers.  
The paper approaches this task in three steps, termed
conceptualizing, institutionalizing, and practicing spatial fit.
First, it explores ways of conceptualizing spatial fit on the
basis of a critical literature review. Here, we set out the case
for using spatial fit as an analytical frame for studying
deficiencies in environmental institutions before summarizing
the principal criticisms leveled at the concept in use. From
this, we explore possible ways forward for applying the
concept in a more reflective, nuanced manner. Second, the
paper turns to the process of institutionalizing spatial fit using
the example of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD).
The WFD represents probably the most ambitious attempt
worldwide to reorder water management around the principle
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of river basin management. We investigate how notions of
resolving spatial misfits are instrumental to the WFD and how
this is expressed in the various institutional arrangements
established by the WFD and subsequently in EU member
states. Third, the paper investigates recent experiences of
practicing spatial fit in the process of implementing the WFD.
It takes as an example the Wupper catchment, a sub-basin of
the Rhine where water has traditionally been managed along
both river basins and political jurisdictions. This section
explores how the process of implementing the WFD in practice
has altered water governance in the sub-basin and to what
effect, drawing primarily on expert interviews and document
analysis. The paper concludes with a reflection on the lessons
to be drawn from the analysis for future use of spatial fit as an
analytical device in water research and policy.
CONCEPTUALIZING SPATIAL FIT: A CRITICAL
LITERATURE REVIEW
Problems of fit in general—as applied to environmental
resource management—are defined as the “failure of an
institution or a set of institutions to take adequately into
account the nature, functionality, and dynamics of the specific
ecosystem it influences” (Ekstrom and Young 2009). For
institutional responses to environmental degradation to be
effective, it follows that these need to fit the attributes of the
resources or ecosystems they address. In the much-cited words
of Oran Young: “The effectiveness of social institutions is a
function of the match between the characteristics of the
institutions themselves and the characteristics of the
biogeophysical systems with which they interact” (2005: 57).
The problem of fit has been addressed by a number of
publications in recent years, notably those on institutional
dimensions of global environmental change (Young 2005,
Ekstrom and Young 2009), on the resilience of social–
ecological systems (Berkes et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2007) and
on common-pool resources (Ostrom et al. 2002). For analytical
purposes, this work commonly distinguishes among three
categories of fit: functional, temporal, and spatial (Folke et al.
1998, 2007, Galaz et al. 2008). This third category of spatial
fit is the subject of our paper. 
Spatial fit refers to the congruence between the geographical
extent of a biophysical system and the management area of an
institution (Wandel and Marchildon 2010:180). Where these
two do not coincide—as in the cases of overfishing
international waters and air pollution cited above—problems
of ineffective and inefficient regulation can be expected. As
a result, the natural resource in question will continue to be
over-exploited, pollution will not be effectively reduced, or
other negative externalities will persist. The concept of spatial
misfit is a useful analytical frame for understanding why
certain institutions do not work as they were intended and how
they might be improved, focusing on aspects of geography. 
Attempts to resolve problems of spatial misfits relating to the
management of public goods in general have a long scholarly
pedigree. In the 1960s, Breton (1965) coined the term “perfect
mapping” to describe the aspiration for maximizing spatial fit
between institutional arrangement and natural resource.
Vincent Ostrom and colleagues (1961) made the case for
“packaging” public goods within appropriate boundaries with
special kinds of government in metropolitan areas capable of
internalizing both positive and negative externalities. At
around the same time, Olson (1969) developed his principle
of fiscal equivalence, advocating better fit in the management
of public goods among the territories where decisions are
made, funding is sourced, and the goods are used. The
economic theory of environmental federalism similarly
argued for political regulations to be oriented around “natural”
spatial units, influencing nature conservation in Germany as
early as the 1950s (Urfei and Budde 2002). This older literature
tended to be quite deterministic in ascribing environmental
problems to spatial misfits. Lee (1993) claimed that when
human responsibility does not match the spatial, temporal, or
functional scale of natural phenomena then unsustainable
resource use is likely. Folke et al. stated in 1998 that “spatial
mismatches occur where the boundaries of management do
not coincide with the boundaries of the ecological entity.” In
a similar vein, Elinor Ostrom concluded in her early pioneering
work that the boundaries of a common-pool resource (CPR)
must be clearly defined: this became the first of her eight
design principles for CPR institutions (Ostrom 1990). 
Recent research on addressing spatial misfits in practice,
although reasserting their critical importance for
environmental governance, has challenged some of the over-
simplistic assumptions underpinning this earlier literature.
The first and most common criticism is that determining the
territorial boundaries of even a “natural” system is no easy
task (Young 2005). As Fitzsimmons (1999) points out, there
are no generally accepted rules for ascribing boundaries to
ecosystems. This would require reaching agreement, among
other things, on which spatial variables to consider, how many
should be used, how to weigh up the relative value of each,
on what scale to identify ecosystems, and how to account for
constant change. No ecosystem is completely closed or static:
exogenous factors will always play a role—sometimes
dramatically so, as with climate change—regardless of how
the boundaries are drawn. Second, the resolution for one
boundary problem often results in the creation of new ones.
As Mitchell (2005:1341) perceptively remarks: “When
restructuring organizations, boundaries or edges are moved,
not removed.” New spatial misfits can emerge with the
jurisdictions of related policy fields that—for good reasons—
are not party to the spatial reorganization in question. A third
criticism relates to scalar dimensions of spatial fit. The
common practice of shifting management of environmental
resources to a higher level in order to cover the larger spatial
scope of a problem often results in higher transaction costs,
as the number of actors, scales, and interactions grow (Young
2002, Galaz et al. 2008). A fourth, more fundamental, criticism
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is that determining spatial fit or misfit in terms of “natural”
boundaries alone overlooks the multiple geographies of a
social–ecological system (Biswas 2004). Beyond its physical
geography a natural resource or ecosystem is characterized
also by political, socioeconomic, and cultural geographies.
These can relate, for instance, to the spatial remit of water use
in economic production processes or the connotations of local
identity attached to a river or water-based ecosystem. Failure
to consider such non-physical dimensions to spatial fit will
inevitably lead to incomplete assumptions and inadequate
recommendations for policy. We need, therefore, to challenge
the notion that the “spatial” in spatial fit is a physical given. 
These critiques do not challenge the importance of addressing
problems of spatial fit in principle. Rather, they highlight the
need for more nuanced understandings of the phenomenon
and less deterministic approaches to resolving spatial fit
problems. On the basis of these critical reflections, a number
of ways forward in understanding and pursuing spatial fit have
been suggested. The general tenor is that we need to go beyond
simple institutional panaceas to more flexible, integrative, and
context-sensitive solutions that reflect the complexity of fit
(Ostrom et al. 2007). Rather than striving to determine the
optimal boundary of an ecosystem once and for all, Young
(2002:64) calls for a practice of monitoring and managing
these resource boundaries. Rather than reordering spatial
boundaries to achieve better fit, Mitchell (2005) argues we
should be devising mechanisms to address difficulties posed
by resource boundary problems. 
Galaz et al. (2008) provide a good overview of those research
strands they regard most suited to meeting these calls for a
more nuanced approach to problems of fit relating to
biophysical systems, drawing on the literatures on polycentric
governance, boundary organizations, and social learning.
They argue that polycentric institutional structures, by virtue
of their multiple and overlapping centers, have the potential
to address environmental problems at multiple scales and
nurture dynamic responses in the face of change and
uncertainty (Galaz et al. 2008:13). They highlight, further, the
value of boundary organizations in linking researchers and
decision makers and of bridging organizations in promoting
social learning, conflict resolution, and vertical and/or
horizontal collaboration (Galaz et al. 2008:7). They also argue
the need, when analyzing fit, to look beyond environmental
institutions to broader governance systems. Here, they
advocate the “adaptive governance” approach, as discussed
by Dietz et al. (2003), because it conveys the difficulty of
control and the importance of dealing with diversity and
conflict (Galaz et al. 2008:12). Interestingly, this literature on
polycentricity and adaptive governance makes the point that
institutional or jurisdictional boundaries are—like ecosystem
boundaries—also hard to define and often dynamic. 
This raises questions of how the concept of spatial fit relates
to, and differs from, the more familiar theoretical and
analytical approaches of polycentric, adaptive, or multi-level
governance and what particular contribution it can make to
this broader literature. The scope of this paper does not permit
a detailed analysis of this relationship, merely two key
observations. First, the concept highlights the spatiality of both
the natural resource/ecosystem and the relevant institutional
arrangements. Analyzing the spatial resonances and
dissonances between the two is central to its explanatory
power. This distinguishes spatial fit from the concept of
polycentricity, with its focus on the coexistence of multiple
centers of decision making independent of each other (Ostrom
et al. 1961, Hooghe and Marks 2003). Second, the spatiality
addressed is limited neither to the scale(s) at which the
resource or ecosystem is managed, nor to the territory of a
jurisdiction, but encompasses the multiple geographies
relating to the use and regulation of a resource or ecosystem.
These can be political, economic, and cultural, as well as
physical. This transcends simple distinctions between
“territorial governance” and “functional governance”
common to the multi-level governance literature (Blatter
2004:534; cf. Hooghe and Marks 2003). Here, the value of
analyzing spatial fit in a nuanced manner, as outlined above,
lies in revealing spatial dimensions to functional (Type II)
governance—which can have any territorial boundary—and
in expanding the notion of spatiality addressed in territorial
(Type I) governance beyond the phenomenon of jurisdictional
boundaries (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
Turning to the issue of water, we now ask how far these general
findings on spatial fit resonate with those developed in the
literature on water resources management. First of all, we note
the huge importance ascribed to spatial misfits as a constraint
on the sustainable management of water resources, as
acknowledged in key works on fit (e.g., Young 2002, Dietz et
al. 2003, Folke et al. 2007). Policies or strategies that address
only a part of the water system, such as a stretch of a river or
a point source of pollution, without considering the broader
spatial context, run the serious risk of ignoring, or even
creating, negative external effects. The attraction to water
managers of using the river basin as the territorial unit for
managing water resources has always been to address what
Mitchell and Pigram (cited in Downs et al. 1991:300) have
called “the political boundary problems that plague integrated
resource management.” The river basin, with its clearly
delineated boundary for surface water, appears to promise the
resolution of spatial misfits in water management. 
Experiences of institutionalizing river basin management,
however, warn against overenthusiastic expectations. Since
the late 1980s, the literature on river basin management has,
on the basis of extensive empirical evidence, challenged the
notion of creating perfect spatial fit, which underlies a purist
interpretation of river basin management. The principal
criticisms resonate powerfully with those cited above (cf.
Huitema et al. 2009). First, even in hydrological terms, river
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basin management does not solve all boundary problems. The
river basin follows surface water, not groundwater,
boundaries. These physical boundaries themselves are
overridden where water supply networks or artificial
waterways connect two or more river basins. Second, river
basin management, although improving spatial fit within the
water sector, often creates new spatial misfits elsewhere (Moss
2003, Horlemann and Dombrowsky 2012). A river basin
authority, covering a different territory than political
jurisdictions, will generally lack the legitimacy and authority
of democratically elected bodies of local, regional, or central
government. It will also experience difficulties in
collaborating with policy fields not organized around river
basins, which are nevertheless critical for water policy, such
as urban development, agriculture, forestry, transportation,
and energy (Moss 2003, Mostert et al. 2007, Pahl-Wostl et al.
2007). Third, structuring water management along an
ecosystem boundary has often encouraged water managers to
focus on biophysical, rather than socioeconomic, problems of
water management (Mostert 1998, Huitema et al. 2009). A
lack of sensitivity toward these forces has contributed to the
recent criticism that river basin management in practice is
often too technocentric and elitist, notwithstanding the rhetoric
of participation and transparency (Molle 2008, Mollinga 2008,
Saravanan et al. 2009). 
The perfect spatial fit, in other words, does not exist—not even
for river basin management. The replacement of existing
institutional arrangements by institutions oriented around
biophysical systems will inevitably create new boundary
problems and fresh mismatches. A purist pursuit of river basin
management will tend to exclude from consideration factors
that are not central to resolving problems of spatial fit. 
Rather than discarding the river basin concept itself, the water
management literature has suggested ways forward that reflect
those cited in the general literature on spatial fit. It is argued
that instead of striving to design the ideal river basin
management institution, we need to consider the territorial unit
of the river basin in a broader context of overlapping social,
economic, political, and physical spaces (Lipschutz 1999). In
line with this thinking, research today tends to advocate
informal collaboration among multiple agencies within a river
basin in preference to the creation of a formalized, “unitary”
river basin organization as generally favored in the past
(Huitema et al. 2009, Borowski et al. 2008, Butterworth et al.
2010). This requires paying less attention to the structure of
an authority responsible for managing a river basin and far
more to the interactions among the multiple organizations
affecting water use within a basin. A patchwork of institutions
affecting water resources at various levels and with various
remits can, it is argued, be more effective than a unitary
authority, especially where river basin management can build
on a tradition of cooperation (Huitema et al. 2009). Concepts
of polycentric governance and adaptive (co-)management of
water are highly formative behind this more flexible approach
to river basin management (Huitema et al. 2009). So too—
although to a lesser extent—are the concepts of bridging
organizations (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007) and intermediaries
(Medd and Marvin 2011).
INSTITUTIONALIZING SPATIAL FIT: THE EU
WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE
The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) is probably the
most ambitious attempt worldwide to institutionalize spatial
fit in water resources management. In force since 2000, the
WFD has made river basin management obligatory for all 27
member states, to be introduced universally and
simultaneously according to a strict timetable (European
Communities 2000). Orienting water management in Europe
around river basins is not the only major innovation of the
WFD. Others include setting ecological alongside chemical
objectives for water quality, encouraging water pricing to
reflect environmental externalities, stipulating public
participation in planning procedures, and taking a “combined
approach” to pollution control, linking emission limit values
to environmental quality standards (Page and Kaika
2003:330–333). However, designating river basins as the core
entity for all these dimensions of water management is central
to the WFD’s design. 
How does the WFD attempt to resolve problems of spatial fit
in water management? In a first step to illustrate how spatial
fit has become institutionalized, we analyze which parts of the
WFD can be attributed to the logic of resolving spatial misfits.
Explicit and extended references to river basins as the unit of
future water management are made in Articles 3 and 13 of the
WFD (European Communities 2000). Article 3 stipulates that
“Member States shall ensure the appropriate administrative
arrangements, including the identification of the appropriate
competent authority, for the application of the rules of this
Directive with each river basin district lying within their
territory.” All requirements for achieving the WFD’s
environmental objectives and all programs of measures are to
be coordinated for the whole of a River Basin District (RBD).
This applies to international, as well as national, river basins.
Article 13 requires river basin management plans to be
produced for each RBD (in the case of transnational basins,
this is not obligatory), allowing for more detailed programs
and plans for sub-basin levels, as necessary. The first river
basin management plans (RBMP) were due by the end of 2009
and are to be updated every 6 yrs. The programs of measures
to achieve the environmental objectives set out in these
RBMPs are to be operational by the end of 2012, leading—
according to the WFD timetable—to “good water status” being
achieved by 2015 or, where circumstances require, by 2027
at the latest. A number of exemptions to the general objectives
—relating to the degree of modification to a water body,
technical unfeasibility, or disproportionate costs—allow for
less stringent objectives or more time for implementation.
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With its emphasis on large-scale RBDs and international
collaboration within and beyond the EU, the WFD appears, at
first sight, to address problems of spatial fit at a meta scale. In
reality, however, it requires a cascaded approach of several
river basin management plans, which—in the case of major
rivers—are made for sub-basins and their subordinate water
bodies (Huitema and Bressers, unpublished manuscript [http:
//www2.bren.ucsb.edu/~idgec/papers/David_Huitema.pdf]). 
The text of the WFD itself is only one—albeit central—form
in which river basin management has become institutionalized
in the EU. If we want to know how these stipulations have
been taken up and translated into institutional arrangements
in member states, we need to look at the components of these
arrangements in more detail. Following the social science
understanding of institutions as rule systems, institutions of
river basin management include water laws and statutes, water
authorities, funding mechanisms for water protection, societal
norms on the value of water, and traditional routines of water
use. Each of these components of an institutional arrangement
can be used to advance river basin management and minimize
spatial misfits. Turning first to laws and statutes, we can
observe that the WFD has now been transposed into national
law in each of the member states. In Germany, the Federal
Water Act and the Water Acts of each of the 16 federal states
(“Länder”) have been revised to accommodate the WFD,
including detailed articles on procedures for institutionalizing
river basin management. Regarding the organizational
structure of future water resources management, the WFD
does not require water authorities to “fit” river basins. The
term “appropriate competent authority” in Art. 3, cited above,
leaves it up to the member states to devise the most suitable
structure for river basin management in their own national
context. This has, inevitably, led to great variety in the models
chosen. Some countries, such as Portugal and Sweden, have
created new authorities to fit their RBDs (Thiel and Egerton
2011, Andersson et al. 2011). England and Wales have named
the basin-based Environment Agency as the competent
authority (White and Howe 2003). France has retained its
duality of political jurisdictions and river basin agencies,
relying on a tradition of multi-party collaboration in river basin
management (Borowski et al. 2008). As far as instruments are
concerned, the river basin management plans (RBMPs) and
programs of measures (PoMs) are devised by these water
authorities for whole river basin districts and sub-basins. The
WFD, notably, makes no specifications on funding schemes
for river basin management, leaving the question of how to
fund measures across river basins entirely to the member
states. By contrast, the procedures for ensuring
implementation of the WFD are very explicit. Member states
are required to monitor progress and report to the European
Commission, as well as involve the public, around the unit of
the river basin. Finally, it is worth noting the development of
river basin management into a widely accepted norm for water
professionals, reinforcing—informally, but powerfully—the
logic of resolving spatial misfits. 
For Germany, the task of institutionalizing river basin
management has proved particularly complex because
responsibility for water resources management rests primarily
with the Länder. This gives rise to a classic case of spatial
misfit between the 10 river basin districts and 16 state
jurisdictions in Germany. In a federal state like Germany, there
are two basic options for implementing river basin
management: an organizational (institutionally “hard”)
solution with a river basin authority equipped with extensive
executive powers, budgets, etc. or a cooperative
(institutionally “soft”) solution with a forum and set of
procedures for reaching agreement between the various
relevant jurisdictions (Dombrowsky, unpublished manuscript 
[http://www.governat.eu/files/files/pb_dombrowsky_implem
enting_wfd.pdf.]). From the beginning, the German central
and state governments followed the second option
(Länderabeitsgemeinschaft Wasser (LAWA), unpublished
manuscript [German guidance document for the implementation
of the EC Water Framework Directive URL: http://www.lawa.
de/documents/Arbeitshilfe_englisch_c40.pdf]) in order to
avoid constitutional problems in setting up a new agency
cutting across administrative jurisdictions and to build on
traditional practices of water management planning in the
states. This has led to the existence of parallel structures: on
the one hand, a legislative and executive framework organized,
as in the past, along administrative jurisdictions and, on the
other, a planning and operative framework organized
primarily around river basins (Moss 2003, 2004, Borowski et
al. 2008; Dombrowsky, unpublished manuscript). This chosen
path has avoided major organizational restructuring but at the
price of hugely increased coordination costs. The federal states
need to coordinate with each other in the river basin districts
and sub-basins on their territory, as well as at an international
level in the case of trans-boundary RBDs. This coordination
process is managed by fora created for different levels of a
river basin: international river basin commissions for trans-
boundary rivers such as the Rhine, river basin associations for
purely national RBDs such as the Weser, and coordination
groups for sub-basins such as the Wupper. To complicate the
picture further, the considerable legislative and executive
authority retained by the states has resulted in differences
emerging in how the WFD is implemented. A comparative
study conducted after the completion of the inventory in 2004
revealed major differences in how the 16 states classified water
bodies, assessed expected water status for 2015, structured
their programs of measures, involved the public in the planning
process, and anticipated funding water protection measures
(Weyand et al. 2007). 
The retention of power by the federal states in the face of river
basin management procedures has raised some criticism
within Germany. The German Advisory Council on the
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Environment, for instance, has recommended strengthening
the powers of the federal government because the state
administrative structures are not compatible with effective and
efficient management of surface waters in river basins
(Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen (SRU) 2004:36). This
proposal of addressing spatial misfit by raising responsibility
to a higher jurisdictional level is, at least for the time being,
politically unrealistic. One significant argument in favor of
the (institutionally “soft”) option chosen is that it creates better
potential for collaboration between water policy and other
policy fields that are also the responsibility of the states or
their subordinate jurisdictions. This applies, for instance, to
legislative and executive powers over land-use planning,
nature conservation, and funding programs. Here, we are
reminded of the criticism in the previous section that river
basin management, if accompanied by a radical reorganization
of jurisdictions, can worsen conditions for collaboration with
other policy fields. The EU itself acknowledges this risk in
one of its WFD guidance documents: “By creating a spatial
unit for water management, based on river basins, it is likely
that spatial conflicts will occur with other policy sectors that
have a significant impact on water, but are structured along
administrative and political boundaries” (European
Communities 2003:17). It recognizes the need for
coordination across sectors, but views the river basin planning
process as the “central tool” to achieving this (European
Communities 2003:20). 
Against this position is a growing body of literature from
across Europe on problems of poor collaboration between
water and land-use planning highlighted by the river basin
management approach of the WFD, e.g., relating to
experiences in England and Wales (White and Howe 2003),
the Netherlands (Huitema and Bressers, unpublished
manuscript), and Sweden (Andersson et al. 2011). Central
government agencies in Germany recognize that water
protection policy cannot be implemented by water protection
agencies alone and that they need the cooperation of various
sectors and actors (Bundesministerium für Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit/Umweltbundesamt (BMU/
UBA) 2005:61–62). However, the potential for cross-sectoral
coordination in the interest of implementing the WFD has not
been exploited effectively to date, as a recent study by the
Academy for Spatial Research and Planning (ARL) confirms
(von Haaren and Galler 2011). A final point of criticism of the
WFD in Germany that resonates with our earlier debate is that
river basin management is not a panacea for all water
management problems. Two experienced representatives of
the state water authority in Hesse have argued prominently
that several aspects of the WFD do not require a river basin
approach, which may even be counter-productive when it
comes to groundwater management, cross-sectoral collaboration,
and pollution regulation (von Keitz and Kessler 2008). They
make the case for a selective form of river basin management,
applied only to those issues where it is really advantageous,
which they identify as upstream/downstream relations and
regulations on flooding, low water levels, and heat discharges.
Not surprisingly, this position was countered promptly with a
robust defense of the river basin as the optimal spatial unit for
managing water (Grünewald 2008).
PRACTICING SPATIAL FIT: IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE WFD IN THE WUPPER SUB-BASIN
How do the institutional arrangements for addressing
problems of spatial fit via the WFD work in practice? How
are actors at the level of a sub-basin coping with the WFD
requirements described in the previous section? In their efforts
to overcome spatial misfits of water management are they
encountering increased problems of interplay with other
policy fields not organized around river basins and, if so, how
are they dealing with this dilemma? To seek answers to these
questions, we investigate the case of the Wupper, a sub-basin
of the Rhine located wholly in the state of Northrhine-
Westphalia, but cutting across three administrative districts
and five counties (“Landkreise”)/cities (see Fig. 1). This
region is selected for its traditional duality of river basin and
political-administrative structures for water management.
Although legislative and executive authority is a state
responsibility, organized around political jurisdictions,
operative water management is conducted by a water board,
the Wupperverband, responsible for a river catchment. The
case focuses on how each party has sought to exploit the
opportunities created by the WFD to improve spatial fit in
water management. It is based on an analysis of documents
relating to WFD implementation in the region and interviews
with 10 representatives from state administrations, the
Wupperverband, local authorities, and environmental groups
conducted from 2009 to 2011.
Fig. 1. Spatial misfits in the Wupper sub-basin.
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In common with all German states, Northrhine-Westphalia
(NRW) did not create a new state agency to implement the
WFD along river basins and sub-basins, but allocated the tasks
of implementation to existing state bodies. The Environment
Ministry (Ministerium für Umwelt und Naturschutz,
Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz des Landes
Nordrhein-Westfalen; MUNLV) of NRW, as the supreme
water authority, is responsible for overall coordination of
WFD implementation in the state, including the River Basin
Management Plans (RBMP) and Programs of Measures (PoM)
for those sections of the Rhine, Maas, Ems, and Weser basins
on NRW territory (MUNLV n.d.). Responsibility for planning
and implementing the WFD in cooperation with local partners
was allocated until 2006 to regional state environment offices,
and from 2007 onward, to the district authorities
(“Bezirksregierungen”). This has inevitably led to problems
of spatial fit, illustrated by the fact that three district authorities
—of Cologne, Düssseldorf, and (to a limited extent) Arnsberg
—are responsible for the Wupper sub-basin. The state’s
response to this structural challenge has been to develop a
number of coordination mechanisms within and beyond the
state apparatus. It has allocated responsibility for coordinating
WFD implementation to one district authority for each sub-
basin. For the Wupper, this coordinating office has been
accorded to the Düsseldorf district. Together, the ministry and
district authorities, in close collaboration with water boards
such as the Wupperverband, have organized numerous round
tables and workshops with organized stakeholders to discuss
the draft versions of the RBMP and PoM, organized primarily
around river basin units. Measures agreed at workshops for
each “planning unit”, a sub-division of the sub-basin, were
compiled as summary documents (“Steckbriefe”) (MUNLV
2009). These and other planning components were fed into
the river basin management plan for the NRW parts of the
Rhine, Maas, Ems, and Weser basins by the end of 2009, as
well as the international RBMPs, as applicable. 
Apart from the huge coordination effort required to work
across the boundaries of each basin, sub-basin, and planning
unit, the state authorities are confronted by the structural
problem that they are dependent on non-state organizations to
achieve the objectives of the WFD, yet the WFD is binding
only for public authorities. To implement the WFD effectively,
they need to cultivate close collaboration with stakeholder
groups to persuade them to support the implementation effort,
exploring potential synergies of interest and resolving
conflicts: a largely unfamiliar task for water authorities in
Germany. The principal stakeholders in NRW are businesses,
the farming community, local authorities, and, above all, the
water boards. 
These water boards, a peculiarity of NRW, were created from
the late 19th century onward to manage water resources around
river catchments in largely industrial areas experiencing
serious pollution and supply problems. Covering around two-
thirds of the area and population of NRW, these water boards
are today responsible for a wide range of water management
tasks, ranging from pollution control, wastewater treatment,
and reservoir management to, increasingly, river restoration.
With a membership of local authorities, major industrial users,
and (where relevant) farming organizations and a strong
funding base supplied by their members, the water boards are
highly effective and influential operators of water
management in their respective sub-basins. The state
authorities are heavily dependent on the water boards to meet
the WFD’s objectives and have, consequently, delegated a
number of operational tasks for implementing the WFD to
them. The water boards themselves are keen to demonstrate
their ability to meet the challenge and to strengthen their
position relative to the state bodies in the process. An initiative
by the former conservative-led NRW government to reduce
the powers of the water boards is illustrative of the tension
that exists between these jurisdictional and basin-based
organizations. Interestingly, the state is subsidizing the costs
of WFD measures to improve water courses by up to 80% with
a massive funding program (“Lebendige Gewässer”). These
state grants, totaling 484 million Euros (2010–2015), represent
a form of political leverage over the operating bodies, such as
the water boards, which will need this money to implement
their own WFD-related projects. 
The Wupperverband was founded in 1930 to manage water
for the heavily industrialized and densely populated Wupper
catchment, covering 813 km2 (Liebeskind 2005). Today, this
basin-oriented water board operates 12 reservoirs, 11 sewage
treatment plants, and other structures for flood retention, etc.
It manages rivers and streams of ~2,300 km in length. With a
membership comprising local and district authorities, water
utilities, and businesses from across the whole catchment, the
Wupperverband regards itself as a fore- and frontrunner of
river basin management in NRW and Germany. Since 1998,
it has held annual symposia on river basin management,
attracting a nation-wide audience. In accordance with the tasks
for implementing the WFD entrusted to it by the district
authorities, the Wupperverband organizes in each of the three
WFD planning units (Upper Wupper, Lower Wupper and
Dhünn) round tables with representatives from ~80
organizations, ranging from chambers of commerce,
environmental NGOs, farming groups, and tourism
organizations to district authorities, local government, and
municipal water utilities. Within each planning unit, the board
has established working groups on areas requiring priority
attention. The Wupperverband is also very active in raising
public awareness about the WFD and enrolling the public in
measures to achieve its objectives, organizing publicity
events, and publishing brochures and newsletters. Indicative
of its self-confidence, the board has developed its own plan
for implementing the WFD (“Gewässerentwicklungsplan”)
for the period 2009–2018 parallel to the RBMP process
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coordinated by the state and district authorities, setting out
measures totaling ~8.8 million Euros for the three planning
units of the Wupper. In this way, it is deliberately going beyond
the requirements of the WFD as set down by the district
authorities, yet at the same time, it is dependent on the 80%
state subsidy for many of its WFD implementation measures.
Altogether, however, the Wupperverband—with its
supportive membership, own source of funding, well-staffed
expertise, and long-standing experience—is a powerful force
for addressing problems of spatial fit in water management. 
Experience in pursuing the WFD’s ecological objectives
indicates, however, that the Wupperverband is itself heavily
reliant on support from other stakeholders in the catchment.
The principal challenges of the WFD for the Wupper
catchment—beyond point-source pollution from industry and
diffuse-source pollution from agriculture—relate to the need
to radically improve the ecological quality of most rivers and
streams. A key indicator here is migrant fish species.
Encouraging their return to the Wupper requires, in particular,
improving passability by removing obstacles such as dams or
weirs. This demands collaboration between upstream and
downstream communities—addressing a classic problem of
spatial fit—and three counties/cities (Oberbergischer Kreis,
Rheinisch-Bergischer Kreis, Leverkusen; see Fig. 1). As the
following example for the Dhünn sub-catchment illustrates,
however, what began as an attempt to resolve a spatial misfit
between jurisdictional boundaries and passability along the
length of the river developed a secondary objective of
improving interplay between water and non-water sectors in
the interest of regional development. 
As one of the few sections of the Wupper with reasonable
prospects for achieving good ecological status by 2015, the
Dhünn is a priority water body for implementing the WFD in
NRW (MUNLV 2009, Wupperverband n.d.). It was selected
as a pilot project for collaborative and participatory
approaches to implementing the WFD in February 2006. The
prime water management aim is to enable full passability for
migratory fish from the mouth of the river to an upstream
reservoir, the Dhünntalsperre. This requires removing or
circumventing four barriers along the course of the river,
improving the morphological structure (e.g., with gravel
banks), and regulating the temperature of the outflow from the
reservoir. What makes the pilot project particularly interesting
is that discussions around these technical interventions of
water management raised more wide-ranging interests
surrounding how the river is used and what role it has in the
region. The plans by the Wupperverband to remove historical
weirs along the Dhünn generated considerable criticism from
cultural heritage groups and agencies. Protests by these groups
prevented the removal of the dam at Burscheid until agreement
was reached in 2008 for a partial removal, which assured fish
passability. The weir at Odenthal-Osenau was given a
protection order by the agency for historic monuments in
response to similar plans for its removal. Only after high-level
talks was agreement reached to install a fish pass and reduce
the height of the weir by one-half. 
More serious still was the conflict over the Freudenthaler
Sensenhammer, the last operating “scythe hammer” in
Germany, where interests in improving river passability came
up against those for protecting this historic monument, the
hydroelectric power it generated, and the tourist attraction it
provided with the adjacent museum. Again, it took external
intervention to push for agreement by intensifying discussion
between the interested parties and setting the issue up as a step
toward the integrated development of the region. This external
intervention came in the form of key players involved in a
program to promote cultural landscape as a development
strategy for the Cologne/Bonn region, the Regionale 2010
(Regionale 2010 Agentur 2007). The Regionale 2010 initiative
has proved highly instrumental in supporting WFD
implementation by generating and backing projects that
connect improvements in river quality to broader development
interests along the Dhünn, thereby improving their access to
state subsidies. By aspiring to create a network of cultural
landscapes in the region, the Regionale 2010 complements the
WFD activities of the Wupperverband and has become an
important partner for the water board. On the basis of these
and other experiences, the Wupperverband is seeking to embed
its water policies in a broader policy environment and to
position itself as a key player in the integrated development
of the region. This actor, designed originally to address
problems of spatial fit by managing water around river basins,
is today acknowledging the additional importance of tackling
problems of institutional interplay.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the value of the concept of spatial fit
in revealing and explaining one of the classic problems behind
the ineffectiveness of environmental institutions: the
mismatch between the geographical extent of a resource or
ecosystem and the territorial scope of relevant institutional
arrangements. The investigation was conducted on three
levels: first, ways of conceptualizing spatial fit in the literature
on environmental institutions in general and water
management in particular; second, ways of institutionalizing
spatial fit in water management through the EU Water
Framework Directive; and, third, ways of practicing spatial fit
as conducted by actors engaged in implementing the WFD in
the Wupper, a sub-basin of the Rhine. 
The literature review revealed a broad consensus in recent
research on environmental and water institutions that
addressing problems of spatial fit remains highly important,
but that the pursuit of perfect spatial fit is fundamentally
flawed. Reorganizing water management around a river basin
will solve some spatial mismatches, but will generate new
ones, especially with other policy fields, such as agriculture,
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nature conservation, or spatial planning, oriented around very
different territories. Creating a river basin agency is likely also
to complicate decision-making processes. If its governing
body is appointed, rather than elected, it will suffer from a lack
of democratic legitimacy and authority. The literature does
not advocate discarding the concept of spatial fit, but rather
adopting a more pragmatic approach, in line with recent
research on river basin management in general. This entails
accepting the existence of multiple geographies of water, with
overlapping social, economic, political, cultural, and physical
spaces, and the importance of collaborative and flexible ways
of working across the boundaries they entail. Spatial fit, like
river basin management in general, should be seen not as a
panacea to environmental problems (Ostrom et al. 2007), but
as a practice of adaptive (co-)management involving a wide
range of relevant stakeholders operating in different spatial
contexts and on different scales. 
Our analysis of the WFD demonstrated the high priority that
this flagship directive accords to river basin management as a
tool for addressing problems of spatial fit. Orienting the
management of water resources around river basins is central
not only to the text of the directive itself but also to various
components of the new institutional arrangements the WFD
has initiated. These include the instruments for planning,
monitoring, and reporting, as well as for analyzing
socioeconomic impacts on water and organizing public
participation. In line with the recommendations emerging
from our literature analysis, however, the WFD desisted from
requiring member states to replace existing institutions with
river basin authorities, specifying only the need to name a
competent authority responsible for coordinating all necessary
activities within a River Basin District. This, interestingly, was
in response to political pressure from Germany and other
member states to prevent reform to existing national
structures, for which the EU has no legal mandate. In Germany,
this has resulted in parallel structures for river basin
management, with executive authority remaining in the hands
of the federal states and planning procedures conducted around
river basins and their sub-basins. This has avoided problems
of organizational restructuring, but at the expense of
significant transaction costs for new forms of coordination
between state water authorities within a river basin district and
between sub-basins within a single state. On the positive side,
this has forced water authorities to seek partnerships with non-
state actors upon whom implementation of the WFD will
depend. 
Our case study of the Wupper sub-basin revealed in more detail
how the WFD is changing practices of water management and
water governance in general. These changes are in part
attributable to the greater emphasis placed on managing water
resources around the unit of the river basin. The state water
authorities are required to coordinate water management
planning across basins and sub-basins. The local water board,
traditionally basin-based, has been able to exploit the
opportunity of the WFD to enhance its own regional power.
Of equal importance to water governance in the catchment,
however, is the need for both state authorities and water board
to seek the support of stakeholders beyond the realm of water
management. Novel forms of interaction are emerging that are
challenging the traditional regulatory style of water
governance. They are also, significantly, forcing water
managers to consider how changes to watercourses can
negatively affect other stakeholders and need, therefore, to be
embedded in broader interests of regional development if they
are to be successful. In this way, the Wupper case correlates
powerfully with the lessons emerging from recent research on
spatial fit in water management demonstrated in this paper:
that resolving problems of spatial fit is best conceived not as
a one-dimensional mission, but part of a wider, more flexible
approach to address the multiple interests surrounding water. 
To conclude, recent ways of conceptualizing, institutionalizing,
and practicing spatial fit via river basin management and the
WFD are all pointing in the same direction. They are telling
us that the value of the concept of spatial fit lies less as a
normative category for institutional design than as an
analytical frame for revealing the multiple geographies of
resource management, the problems that these may generate,
and options for addressing them. Reinterpreting spatial fit
along these lines requires a more nuanced and relational
application of the concept. Our paper suggests, first, that future
research and policy on spatial fit should be exploring ways of
working with and across boundaries, rather than trying to
remove them. These boundaries, moreover, should not be
conceived of as purely physical ones, but should reflect the
political, socioeconomic, and cultural geographies of an
ecosystem or natural resource. In this context, more work is
needed on those boundary organizations that strive to span the
various geographies of resource management. Second, for
analytical purposes, it may be opportune to distinguish
between problems of fit and interplay, but in reality—as the
Wupper case illustrates—they are often interlinked. We need
to conceive of fit and interplay as complementary dimensions
of collaborative water management. Third, in investigating
practices of addressing problems of spatial fit, research should
pay greater attention to the interrelationship between agency
and institutions. How actors interpret institutions, give them
meaning through their actions, and adapt to the constraints and
opportunities they generate is fundamental to institutional
effectiveness. Fourth, we have observed from the study of the
Wupper that the spatial reconfiguration of water management
can substantially reorder power constellations. The WFD has
strengthened the hand of the river-basin-based Wupperverband
vis-à-vis the state water authorities, yet these still exert
substantial influence through their funding programs, whereas
new actors have been enrolled to improve water quality as part
of a wider initiative for regional development under the
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Regionale 2010 program. Work on spatial fit needs to pay
greater attention to issues of power and politics in processes
of institutional adaptation. Finally, in line with recent work on
polycentric governance and social–ecological systems, we
should avoid negative assumptions about the co-existence of
multiple jurisdictions and institutional arrangements and study
empirically their relative merits as well as their limitations.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art2/responses/
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